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WHAT A LONG, STRANGE TRIP IT’S BEEN: MARIJUANA’S
FIFTY-YEAR JOURNEY FROM AN ILLEGAL NARCOTIC TO A
LAWFUL RECREATIONAL DRUG AND WHETHER
WORKPLACE DRUG POLICIES WILL NOW GO UP IN SMOKE
By Bryan Diemer
Mr. Diemer is an attorney for Local 150 of the International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Until recently, marijuana, a controlled narcotic under federal law since 1970, had been
unlawful in all fifty states.1 As a result of politically unacceptable outcomes in the
criminal justice system resulting from arrests and convictions for marijuana possession,
many states, including Illinois, have liberalized their drug laws. In 2014, the Illinois
General Assembly legalized marijuana used for medical purposes.2 More recently, the
General Assembly legalized recreational marijuana.3 Despite legalizing marijuana for
medicinal or recreational use, the General Assembly did not specifically address the
impact of these laws on the workplace. In fact, in both instances, the General Assembly
attempted to preserve the status quo in the workplace by allowing employers to continue
to enforce workplace drug policies, including zero-tolerance policies.4 Based on this new
legislative framework, adult employees using marijuana need no longer fear the
constable, but they must still be mindful of the HR Director.
Part II of this Article discusses the federal government’s treatment of marijuana over the
years. Part III reviews the data documenting the human and economic costs associated
with enforcing marijuana laws and argues that the outcomes in the criminal justice
system, having become untenable, established the conditions that made legalization
efforts in some of the individual states possible. Part IV examines Illinois’s medical
marijuana law and discusses impact of medical marijuana drugs on the workplace. Part
V describes the opioid epidemic and its relationship to the Illinois Alternative to Opioids
Act of 2018. Part VI discusses Illinois’s recent recreational marijuana statute and
describes how this law will affect the workplace. Even though Illinois’s medical and
recreational marijuana laws specifically attempted to preserve the status quo for
employees, this Article will conclude in Part VII by arguing that consumer demand for
marijuana and labor market conditions will diminish the value of the employer
protections in the Recreational Cannabis Act and will ultimately force Illinois employers
to liberalize their existing policies regarding marijuana.
II.

FEDERAL REGULATION OF MARIJUANA

In what may come as a surprise to anyone who has read a newspaper in the last fifty
years, “[f]or most of American history, marijuana was legal to grow and consume.” 5
People used marijuana recreationally, while doctors and pharmacists prescribed it to
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treat numerous conditions,6 including fatigue, coughing fits, asthma, rheumatism,
delirium tremens, migraine headaches, and menstrual symptoms.7 Marijuana’s
inclusion in the U.S. Pharmacopoeia in 18508 is a testament to its perceived medicinal
value in the mid-nineteenth century.
Attempts by the individual states to regulate marijuana began in the early part of the
twentieth century and were largely driven by racism and xenophobia occasioned by the
presence of black and Latino migrant workers.9 In 1919, California was one of the first
states to prohibit the sale and possession of marijuana.10 Illinois outlawed marijuana in
1931.11 The first attempt by the federal government to regulate marijuana occurred in
193712 when Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act.13 The Marihuana Tax Act did not
outlaw marijuana per se, but instead required those who sold or possessed marijuana,
as well as physicians who prescribed it, to purchase a tax stamp.14 Congress set the tax at
such a prohibitively high rate that the Marihuana Tax Act “was tantamount to a legal
prohibition.”15 Violators of the Marihuana Tax Act were charged with “tax evasion” and
faced maximum fines of $2,000 and five years in jail.16 Notably, the American Medical
Association opposed the legislation, suggesting that the physicians of the day saw
medicinal value in prescribing marijuana to patients.17 However, in 1941, marijuana was
removed from the U.S. Pharmacopoeia.18
In 1951, Congress passed the Boggs Act, which established harsh mandatory minimum
sentences for simple possession of marijuana, as well as other drugs.19 Specifically, an
initial conviction for drug possession resulted in a mandatory two-year minimum
sentence; a second conviction carried from five to ten years; and a third carried from ten
to twenty years.20 As Matthew Braun writes, “The 1951 Boggs Act was enacted because
politicians pushed a narrative that marijuana was used by African Americans and
Mexican Americans.”21 Five years later, in 1956, Congress passed the Narcotic Control
Act and actually increased the penalties set forth in the Boggs Act.22
A. Controlled Substances Act
In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
(“Comprehensive Drug Act”) which repealed the mandatory minimum sentences of the
earlier legislation, and consolidated the nation’s drug laws generally. 23 Title II of the
Comprehensive Drug Act is the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).24 The CSA
established five schedules of controlled substances and classified marijuana as a
Schedule I drug, alongside such drugs as LSD, cocaine, heroin, and peyote.25
Marijuana’s status as a Schedule I drug was based on Congress’s determination that it
“has a high potential for abuse” and “has no currently accepted medical use in treatment
in the United States,” and that “there is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug …
under medical supervision.”26 Opiates are listed as Schedule II drugs.27 According to the
CSA, though Schedule II drugs like opiates have “a high potential for abuse,” they are
distinguishable from Schedule I drugs because they have a “currently accepted medical
use in treatment in the United States or a currently accepted medical use with severe
restrictions.”28 “The CSA provides for the periodic updating of schedules and delegates
to the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, to add, remove or transfer substances to, from or between schedules.”29 After

SPRING 2020

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

5

Congress passed the CSA, marijuana was finally outlawed in all fifty states.30 Marijuana
remains a Schedule I narcotic today, notwithstanding considerable efforts to reschedule
the drug.31 In fact, there is legislation currently pending in Congress to remove cannabis
from the CSA.32
For many years, the CSA set forth the basic framework for regulating drug use in society
and the workplace. To the extent there were any changes in drug laws, the changes
created greater restrictions regarding the use of drugs in the workplace. For example,
the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 requires some federal contractors and all federal
grant recipients to agree to maintain a drug-free workplace as a precondition for
receiving a federal contract.33 Covered employers must publish a statement that
controlled substances are prohibited in the workplace, punish employees convicted of
drug offenses, and make a good faith effort to maintain a drug-free workplace.34
B. Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act
In 1991, Congress passed the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act in
response to its perception that “drug and alcohol abuse [had] become an increasing
problem in the workplace.”35 The statute directed the U.S. Department of
Transportation (“DOT”) to develop drug and alcohol regulations for employees in the
railroad, trucking, aviation, and mass-transit industries.36 In 1994, the various
administrations within DOT, including the Federal Highway Administration (“FHA”)
and the Federal Transit Authority (“FTA”), promulgated regulations pursuant to the
Congressional mandate. Under rules promulgated by the FHA and the FTA, covered
employers must perform drug and alcohol testing on every employee performing a
“safety-sensitive function,”37 including employees of intrastate motor carriers who
perform “safety sensitive functions.”38 Required testing includes: random testing,39 preemployment testing,40 reasonable suspicion testing,41 post-accident testing42 and
return-to-duty testing.43 When an employee tests positive for drug use or refuses to
submit to a required test, the FHA and FTA rules require the employer to remove the
employee from the safety-sensitive function44 until such time as the employee is
evaluated and tests negative for drugs on a return-to-duty test.45 Notably, the
regulations do not require an employer to discipline or terminate an employee who fails
a drug test. The DOT regulations inform many collective bargaining agreements
covering employees working in safety-sensitive industries or holding commercial
drivers’ licenses (“CDLs”).
Even though alcohol abuse can be just as damaging to individual employees, and
ultimately the workplace, drugs are often treated more harshly than alcohol in collective
bargaining agreements. For example, the Joint Labor Management Uniform
Drug/Alcohol Abuse Program46 incorporated into the collective bargaining agreements
entered into between Local 150 of the International Union of Operating Engineers (as
well as other trades) and the Mid-America Bargaining Association (“MARBA”) treats
drug-related infractions differently than alcohol-related infractions. These collective
bargaining agreements cover thousands of employees working in the construction
industry throughout northeast Illinois. On its face, the Policy provides that employees
testing positive for drug use “will be fired.”47 In contrast, the Policy provides that
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“[e]mployees found under the influence of alcohol while on duty, or while operating a
company vehicle, will be subject to termination.”48 Thus, the Policy takes a zero
tolerance approach to drugs, while allowing for leniency in cases involving alcohol.
One explanation for the Policy’s disparate treatment of drugs and alcohol could be that
drugs like marijuana were unlawful and the negotiators were justified in attempting to
rid the workplace of illicit drugs. Another more subtle explanation is that labor and
management negotiators were more likely to drink alcohol than to use drugs, making
them less sympathetic to drugs than alcohol. Regardless of the explanation, the
existence of federal drug laws and regulations made it easy for labor and management to
take a hard line on drugs—particularly in safety-sensitive industries.
C. 2014 and 2018 Farm Bills
“Cannabinoid is the name given to all the chemical compounds found in cannabis, the
plant genus that includes both hemp and marijuana.”49 Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)
and cannabidiol (CBD) and are the most common cannabinoids found in cannabis.50
THC is the psychoactive ingredient causing euphoria.51 CBD, in contrast, is
nonintoxicating and does not produce euphoria or psychoactive effects.52 THC and CBD
are both present in hemp and marijuana; marijuana is rich in THC; hemp is richer in
CBD.”53 The initial definition “marihuana” under the CSA was broad enough to include
both hemp and marijuana.54
Many Americans first learned of CBD in 2013 when Dr. Sanjay Gupta hosted a program
on CNN in which he profiled a six-year-old girl in living in Colorado who used CBD to
reduce seizures caused by epilepsy.55 The program generated immediate interest in, as
well as demand for, CBD oil.56 As the New York Times reported, “Mere weeks after the
CNN documentary aired, the spike in CBD interest prompted the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority to issue an investor alert on marijuana stock scams: As the F.D.A.
would later show, many online CBD products contained little or no CBD whatsoever.” 57
In a seemingly unrelated earlier event, in 2011, James Comer won an election for
Kentucky state agriculture commissioner after campaigning to legalize industrial
hemp.58 Comer’s core constituents were Kentucky tobacco farmers desperate for a new
cash crop.59 Giving heed to Tip O’Neill’s oft-cited adage that “all politics is local,” Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky later included a hemp pilot program for
“research” in the Agriculture Act of 2014 (also known as the 2014 Farm Bill).60 Colorado
Congressman, now Governor of Colorado, Jared Polis, also sponsored the pilot
program.61 The legislation defined hemp as cannabis containing less that 0.3 percent
THC.62 The 0.3 percent threshold was not based in science; it was, instead, an arbitrary
threshold.63 The New York Times reports that “entrepreneurs interpreted this researchoriented pilot program as the de facto legalization of cannabidiol”64—which is curious
since “the 2014 Farm Bill did not modify the [CSA] to exclude from Schedule I either
hemp or products containing THC derived from hemp.”65
In December 2018, Congress passed the Agricultural Improvement Act of 201866 (also
known as the 2018 Farm Bill), which, based on language inserted by Senator
McConnell67 defined hemp as “the plant Cannabis sativa L. and any part of that plant,
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including the seeds thereof and all derivatives, extracts, cannabinoids, isomers, acids,
salts, and salts of isomers, whether growing or not, with a [THC] concentration of not
more than 0.3 percent on a dry weight basis” 68 and removed hemp from classification
as marijuana under the CSA.69 This opened the door to the lifting of restrictions on the
sale, transfer and possession of hemp, as well as the sale, transfer, and possession of its
components—including CBD.70
Importantly, the 2018 Farm Bill did not legalize CBD outright. Instead, the 2018 Farm
Bill provides that CBD “derived from hemp will be legal, if and only if that hemp is
produced in a manner consistent with the Farm Bill … and by a licensed grower.”71 CBD
produced in other settings remains an illegal Schedule I narcotic.72 And cannabis with
more than 0.3% THC remains a Schedule I narcotic under the CSA.73 As Catie
Wightman notes, “The difference between hemp and marijuana comes down to a tenth
of a percent of THC; Cannabis sativa L. is legal hemp at 0.3% THC but becomes illegal
marijuana at 0.4% THC.”74 She adds: “The difference between illegal hemp and illegal
marijuana is impossible to see with the naked eye and determining the quantity of THC
to such a degree requires sensitive testing equipment.”75
CBD has been touted as an effective treatment for depression, insomnia, brain injury,
opioid addiction, diabetes, arthritis, inflammation and joint pain, and nausea from
chemotherapy.76 Despite its increasing popularity, “[m]ost of the information about
CBD’s effects in humans is anecdotal or extrapolated from animal studies, and few
rigorous trials have been conducted,”77 causing at least one doctor to characterize CBD
as an “expensive placebo” rather than a “panacea.”78 The Federal Drug Administration
(“FDA”) explains, “[o]ther than one prescription drug product to treat two rare, severe
forms of epilepsy, [the FDA] has not approved any other CBD products, and there is
very limited available information about CBD, including about its effects on the body.”79
In 2017, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine found limited
evidence of the ability of CBD to treat anxiety.80 Beyond that, according to the Center for
Science in the Public Interest, there is no evidence that CBD “will lower the risk of
diabetes, shrink tumors, wean a person off opioids, ease schizophrenia or calm anxious
pets.”81 There is, however, encouraging research indicating that CBD used by recovering
opioid addicts has proven effective in helping them avoid relapse.82
In 2019, the policy director for the Center for Science in the Public Interest observed
that since the passage of the 2018 Farm Bill, “the marketplace [has been] full of
products that are essentially unknown” and that consumers are not aware “that they are
guinea pigs.”83 Undeterred by the scientific uncertainty, a recent survey conducted by an
investment bank found that 7% of adults in the United States, 17 million people, had
reported using CBD in the months following the passage of the 2018 Farm Bill.84
Similarly, in 2019, Gallop surveyed 2,500 Americans and found 14% reported using CBD
for pain, anxiety and sleep issues.85 Usage of CBD will likely continue to increase as it
becomes more available and as people continue to report positive results (actual or
perceived) after using CBD products. A cannabis market research firm predicted sales of
CBD will reach $22 billion by 2022.86
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The FDA currently has jurisdiction to regulate hemp. Remarkably, the agency has
neither evaluated nor approved any of the CBD products sold over the counter today, an
array that includes oils, creams, bath bombs and dog treats.87 Indeed, though CBD is
explicitly not allowed in dietary supplements or foods, “the FDA has tended to overlook
these infractions.”88 Because of limited resources, and perhaps the anti-regulatory
fervor of the Trump administration, the FDA’s regulatory oversight has been limited to
“warn[ing] companies to stop making unfounded claims” and engaging in deceptive
advertising.89 The FDA has filed only nine warning letters against CBD companies;
those companies faced “few serious repercussions.”90
There are currently over 1,000 products available online containing CBD.91 CBD
products are often marketed to suggest that they do not contain any THC or, if they do,
that the THC will not be detected on a drug test.92 On December 14, 2016, the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency responded to a comment about whether a proposed rule regarding
marijuana extracts was applicable to CBD if not combined with other cannabinols, like
THC.93 The DEA responded, “For practical purposes, all extracts that contain CBD will
also contain at least small amounts of other cannabinoids.”94 In a footnote, the DEA
further explained, “Although it might be theoretically possible to produce a CBD extract
that contains absolutely no amounts of other cannabinoids, the DEA is not aware of any
industrially-utilized methods that have achieved this result.”95
A 2012 study published in the Journal of Analytical Toxicology found that a common
forensic drug testing method can easily mistake CBD for THC,96 resulting in false
positive result for an employee using a CBD product. Moreover, a 2017 study published
in the Journal of the American Medical Association (“JAMA”) found that after testing
84 CBD products purchased online, 26.19% of the samples had less CBD than indicated
on the label, while 43.85% of the samples had more CBD than indicated on the label. 97
Only 30.95% of the products tested were labeled accurately.98 That is, nearly 70% of the
products were labeled incorrectly. Notably, THC was detected in 18 of the 84 samples at
levels the authors of the study observed “may be sufficient to produce intoxication or
impairment, especially among children.”99 The authors concluded by explaining that
their “findings highlight the need for manufacturing and testing standards, and
oversight of medical cannabis products.”100 The JAMA study confirms the unregulated
nature of the nascent CBD industry; its detection of THC in levels capable of producing
intoxication in over 20% of the products tested should give pause to any employee
subject to drug testing who is considering using a CBD-infused product. Based on the
findings, an employee subject to workplace drug testing who uses a lawful CBD product
(even one marketed as being undetectable on a drug test) has a 20% chance that THC
will be detected.
As will be discussed more thoroughly below, CBD will have a dramatic impact on the
workplace. At the risk of oversimplification, Congress legalized hemp because the Senate
Majority Leader wanted to create a new cash crop for struggling tobacco farmers in his
state. The impact of CBD on the workplace was never debated prior to the passage of the
2018 Farm Bill and neither Congress nor the Department of Labor has offered any
guidance to employers obligated to maintain a drug-free workplaces under federal law
as to how they should respond when their employees begin taking unregulated CBD that
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is laced with TCH. It will now be up to practitioners to figure out how to integrate CBD
into existing drug policies.
III.

MARIJUANA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

From a criminal justice perspective, federal and state drug laws have had a devastating
effect on communities, as well as state and local budgets. In 1971, President Nixon
officially declared war on drugs.101 He identified drugs as “public enemy number one”
and announced that “in order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a
new, all-out offensive.”102 One commentator observed that with those words, President
Nixon “laid the foundation for a return to rigid, punitive drug sentencing” and “cast
would-be drug offenders as dangerous enemies to be fought with the force of the
criminal justice system.”103 President Nixon was the first president to address drugs as a
“central national-policy concern”; his predecessors “generally did not involve
themselves actively in drug control policy.” 104 Former Nixon aide John Ehrlichman
conceded in a 1994 interview that Nixon intended his war on drugs to undermine his
perceived enemies; he explained:
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that had two
enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We
knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by
getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin,
and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We
could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify
them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the
drugs? Of course we did.105
Presidents Ford and Carter both “distanced themselves from the drug issue.”106 One
commentator observed that President Ford “largely backed away from Former President
Nixon’s drug policy” and “presented a milder tone to drug policy reform.”107 For his part,
President Carter asked Congress to consider decriminalizing marijuana.108 Congress,
however, did not enact any legislation in response to President Carter’s request.109
President Regan took office in 1981 and returned to the bellicose rhetoric that
characterized the Nixon years. For instance, President Reagan criticized the policy of the
Carter administration by explaining that he was “taking down the surrender flag ….
[and] running up the battle flag.”110 President Reagan shifted the focus of national drug
policy from treatment to enforcement and advocated zero-tolerance policies in the
workplace, among other policies.111 President George H.W. Bush continued President
Reagan’s drug policies, but increased the focus on law enforcement efforts.112
Subsequent administrations continued to pour billions of dollars into the war on drugs,
but policy differences did emerge as some administrations, for example, prioritized
treatment over enforcement (Bill Clinton) or prioritized addressing consumer demand
over efforts to cut off the supply of drugs (George W. Bush).113
The hippies, once targeted by Nixon, grew up, got jobs, and presumably fell off the radar
of law enforcement. This is not to say, however, that their appetite for marijuana
dissipated. White professionals, even lawyers, have always been able to purchase and
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use marijuana without much fear of criminal recrimination. Even though marijuana
usage rates are comparable across races, black and brown people have had different
experiences with the criminal justice system when it comes to marijuana. For example, a
2013 study conducted by the American Civil Liberties Union explained that “despite the
fact that marijuana is used at comparable rates by whites and blacks, state and local
governments have aggressively enforced marijuana laws selectively against Black people
and communities.”114 The ACLU study found that a black person was 3.73 times more
likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than a white person.115 Another report
found that Blacks and Hispanics “make up twenty percent of the marijuana smokers in
the United States but comprise 58% of marijuana offenders sentenced under federal law
in 1995.”116
The costs of enforcing drug laws have been staggering. Between 1970 and 2010, the U.S.
spent $1 trillion on the war on drugs, including $121 billion to arrest more than 37
million non-violent drug offenders, including those arrested for marijuana possession. 117
The U.S. currently spends more than $47 billion each year on the war on drugs.118 A
2010 study from the libertarian Cato Institute found that in 2008, state and local
governments spent a combined $5.4 billion (after accounting for offsetting fines and
seizures) on enforcing marijuana prohibitions.119 According to that study, Illinois spent
over $89 million on marijuana enforcement.120
The massive expenditures at the federal and state level have done nothing to curb
demand for marijuana. The 2013 ACLU report found that “[b]etween 2001 and 2010,
there were 8,244,943 marijuana arrests, of which 7,295,880, or 88%, were for
marijuana possession.”121 A 2018 article in the Federal Sentencing Reporter observed,
“More than 10 million marijuana arrests, the vast majority for simple possession, have
already been recorded nationwide in the twenty-first century.”122 The Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration estimated that 43.5 million Americans
(15.9% of the population) used marijuana in 2018, this represented an increase from
2002–2017.123 By any objective measure, the war on drugs, particularly marijuana, has
been an absolute failure.
President Obama entered the White House as the first chief executive in our history to
publicly acknowledge smoking and inhaling marijuana recreationally.124 Despite
acknowledging the legitimacy of a continued discussion about the utility of drug laws,
President Obama explained, “I personally, and my administration’s position, is that
legalization is not the answer.”125 The following year, President Obama’s Justice
Department issued a memorandum (the so-called “Cole Memo”126) clarifying that the
federal government would not prioritize criminal prosecution of citizens complying with
the marijuana laws of their states.127 Many considered the Cole Memo to be a signal to
the states that the Justice Department would not interfere with local efforts to legalize or
decriminalize medical or recreational marijuana.128 On January 14, 2018, Attorney
General Jefferson Beauregard Sessions III rescinded the Cole Memo and reminded
federal prosecutors that Congress had determined that “marijuana is a dangerous drug
and marijuana activity is a serious crime.”129 Following the 2018 midterm elections,
Sessions was unceremoniously replaced by William P. Barr, who announced that he
would leave enforcement of marijuana laws to the states.130
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The growing unease, on both the political right131 and left,132 with the human and
economic costs of the war on drugs fueled a legalization movement. Proponents of
legalization cited the costs of the failed war on drugs, as well as the potential economic
benefits that would come from legalization. The Cato Institute study found, using 2008
numbers, that legalizing all drugs and imposing appropriate sin taxes on those drugs
would save $41.3 billion a year in law-enforcement costs and generate $46.7 billion in
annual tax revenues ($8.7 billion attributable to marijuana).133 Again using 2008
numbers, the Cato Institute found that legal marijuana in Illinois would generate nearly
$125 million in annual tax revenues.134 The lure of new tax revenue streams, particularly
in the face of the exorbitant costs associated with the failed war on drugs, caused voters
and politicians alike to embrace efforts to legalize marijuana. In 1996, California became
the first state to legalize medical marijuana; it did so through a ballot initiative. 135 In
2012, Colorado and Washington became the first states to legalize recreational
marijuana.136 Each state did this through a ballot initiative, rather than through the
legislative process.137 President Obama responded to the legalization initiatives in
Colorado and Washington by explaining, “[I]t’s important for it to go forward because
it’s important for society not to have a situation in which a large portion of people have
at one time or another broken the law and only a select few get punished.” 138 Currently,
33 states (including Illinois) have legalized medical marijuana; recreational marijuana
has been legalized by 11 states (including Illinois) and the District of Columbia. New
York and New Jersey are expected to join the list of eleven soon.139 Illinois was the first
state to legalize marijuana through the legislative process.140 There is currently
bipartisan legislation pending in Congress, the Strengthening the Tenth Amendment
through Entrusting States (STATES) Act, that would protect states that have legalized
marijuana from intervention from the federal government.141
Illinois liberalized its drug laws in response to unacceptable outcomes in our criminal
justice system, not unacceptable outcomes in the workplace. This is not to say that an
employee discharged for violating a workplace drug policy ever considered that outcome
acceptable or just. Rather, this is to say that changes in state drug laws were not
intended as a reform of labor and employment laws. The General Assembly specifically
attempted to preserve the status quo in the workplace, while at the same time legalizing
marijuana for medical and recreational use. Whether the status quo can or should be
preserved is a question addressed below.
IV.

MEDICAL MARIJUANA IN ILLINOIS

On January 1, 2014, the Compassionate Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act
(“Medical Cannabis Act”) went into effect in Illinois.142 The Medical Cannabis Act
allows qualifying patients to use cannabis without being subject to arrest, prosecution,
or property forfeiture.143 In enacting the law, the General Assembly specifically found
that “[c]annabis has many currently accepted medical uses in the United States, having
been recommended by thousands of licensed physicians to at least 600,000 patients in
states with medical cannabis laws.”144 The legislature further found that “medical
research has confirmed the beneficial uses of cannabis in treating or alleviating the pain,
nausea, and other symptoms associated with a variety of debilitating medical conditions,
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including cancer, multiple sclerosis, and HIV/AIDS . . .”145 As explained above, one of
the rationales given by Congress for banning Schedule I drugs, including marijuana, was
that such drugs had “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States.”146 At least with respect to marijuana, the federal and state legislative findings
are at odds with one another.
Notably, the General Assembly’s certitude is not present in the scientific community. To
date, “[m]arijuana has no officially recognized health benefits according to the [FDA]
and more than twenty leading medical and scientific organizations,”147 including the
National Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine, American Academy of Family
Physicians, American Academy of Pediatrics, American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, American College of Physicians, and the American Medical
Association.148 One commentator has explained, “an absence of FDA approval does not
prove that marijuana is ineffective or unsafe.”149 Instead, “[i]t simply means that the
benefits and risks of the drug have not been studied sufficiently to meet FDA standards,
and the risk/benefit ratio is therefore undetermined.”150 As the National Academy of
Medicine explained in a 2017 report, “very little is known about the efficacy, dose, routes
of administration, or side effects of commonly used and commercially available
cannabis products in the United States.”151
There is, to be sure, anecdotal evidence from both patients and physicians to suggest
that marijuana is effective for treating epilepsy, Parkinson’s disease, Tourette’s
syndrome and glaucoma. There is also “good-quality research” (though not sufficient to
meet FDA standards) suggesting that marijuana may be beneficial for ameliorating
chronic neuropathic or cancer pain, and spasticity associated with neurological
disorders like multiple sclerosis.152 We simply do not have the rigorous research from
the scientific community that usually precedes a change in public policy. This paper has
argued that legalization was a direct response to unacceptable outcomes in the criminal
justice system. It is difficult to imagine that any state, including Illinois, would have
legalized medical marijuana with such an underdeveloped body of scientific research if
it had not been part of a broader plan of criminal justice reform. Drug laws in this
country have always been driven by politics, not science, and the recent reforms in
Illinois are no exception.
Although the Medical Cannabis Act legalized the use of medical marijuana, the law
preserved employers’ rights to administer drug tests, enforce zero-tolerance policies
and/or maintain drug free workplaces.153 And, in an acknowledgment of existing federal
laws, the Medical Cannabis Act provided, “Nothing in this Act shall limit and employer’s
ability to discipline an employee for failing a drug test if failing to do so would put the
employer in violation of federal law or cause it lose a federal contract or funding.”154
Thus, for an employer with an ideological commitment to a drug-free workplace or
otherwise subject to federal regulations, the Medical Cannabis Act did little to alter the
treatment of marijuana in the workplace. Put another way, employees subject to
workplace drug policies will not be able to use medical marijuana without facing
repercussions in the form of workplace discipline, despite passage of the Medical
Cannabis Act. Initially enacted as a “pilot program,” the Cannabis Act became
permanent in 2019.155
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No Illinois court has ruled on whether a valid medical marijuana patient may be
disciplined or discharged for using marijuana outside of the workplace. 156 Courts in
other jurisdictions have held, however, that similarly structured medical marijuana laws
were not intended to alter the employment relationship. For example, in Casias v. WalMart,157 the Sixth Circuit held that holding a medical marijuana card was not a defense
to disciplinary action taken by a private employer against an employee for failing a drug
test. The court found the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act was intended to protect
users from state action and was not intended to regulate private employment.158 The
Sixth Circuit agreed with district court’s finding that “private employees are not
protected from disciplinary action as a result of their use of medical marijuana, nor are
private employers required to accommodate the use of medical marijuana in the
workplace.”159
Similarly, in Coles v. Harris Teeter, LLC,160 an at-will employee covered by Washington
D.C.’s medical marijuana law was terminated upon failing a drug test. The court
explained that it could not ascertain a “clear policy mandate in the District’s law that an
employer must accept an employee’s lawful marijuana use.”161 Instead, the district court
observed that the statute at issue in that case, as well as similar statutes in other states,
“legalized the use of marijuana for certain medical purposes, but did not otherwise
explicitly mandate that employers must tolerate that use.”162
Finally, in Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc., the California Supreme Court
in a 5–2 decision ruled that it was not going to impose obligations on private employers
with respect to the state’s medical marijuana law, explaining that “[n]othing in the text
or history of the [state medical marijuana law] suggests the voters intended the measure
to address the respective rights and duties of employers and employees.”163 These cases
demonstrate that courts have allowed employers to enforce otherwise reasonable drug
policies, notwithstanding medical marijuana laws. Based on the structure of the Illinois
Medical Cannabis Act, it is hard to imagine an Illinois court analyzing a termination
case brought by a user of medical marijuana any differently.
The passage of medical marijuana laws may have legalized marijuana usage in certain
contexts and made marijuana more widely available for patients, but it appears not to
have had much of an impact on the workplace. Although the above cases appear
correctly decided as a matter of statutory construction, the outcomes are troubling from
the plaintiffs’ perspectives and highlight one of the difficulties in managing medical
marijuana laws going forward. The plaintiffs in the above cases were all terminated for
using lawful medical marijuana. Most state marijuana laws were passed on ballot
initiates and generated tremendous attention in the press. Individual employees are, of
course, responsible for knowing the requirements of their jobs, including all workplace
policies. But as a practical matter, it is not unreasonable for an employee who voted in a
successful ballot initiative and later obtained the proper credentials for a medical
marijuana card to conclude that the new state law trumped any workplace drug policy.
The discharged employee in such a scenario looks different (in the terms of intent,
culpability, etc.) than an employee facing discharge for violating a drug policy prior to
the passage of a state medical or recreational marijuana law. Going forward, it is
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imperative that unions and employers explain the relationship between state
legalization efforts and workplace policies to avoid a situation where an employee
complies with state law, but nevertheless finds herself in violation of an employer’s drug
policy.
V.

THE OPIATE EPIDEMIC AND THE ILLINOIS ALTERNATIVE TO
OPIODS ACT OF 2018

The opioid epidemic has plagued the United States. Barbara Fedders explains: “Opioids
are a class of drugs that include pain relievers available legally by prescription, such as
oxycodone, marketed as OxyContin; hydrocodone, marketed as Vicodin; codeine;
morphine; the illegal drug heroin; and synthetic products such as fentanyl and
carfentanil.”164 “Each is chemically related and interacts with opioid receptors on nerve
cells in the body and brain, producing pain relief and euphoria.” 165 According to Dr.
Zeez N. Kain, “consistent consumption of drugs like Hydrocodone and Oxycodone leads
to increased tolerance and a condition called hyperalgesia, which is increased sensitivity
to pain after long term intake of pain medication.”166 “Those consequences, in turn,
require more pain medication for the patient and dependency develops before the drugs
were ever technically abused.” 167
The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration “estimated that 10.3
million people aged 12 and older misused opioids in the past year, including 9.9 million
prescription pain reliever misusers and 808,000 heroin users.”168 The same survey also
estimated that 2 million people aged 12 or older had an opioid use disorder in 2018.169
Tragically, the CDC reports that opioid overdoses continue to claim an average of 128
American lives each day.170
Illinois was not immune from this plague. In 2018, Illinois enacted the Alternative to
Opioids Act of 2018 (“Opioids Act”). The Opioids Act, passed as an amendment to the
Medical Cannabis Act, cited specific findings from the Illinois Opioid Action Plan,
released in September of 2017.171 The Action Plan characterized “[t]he opioid epidemic
[as] the most significant public health and public safety crisis facing Illinois.”172 It
further found that “drug overdoses have now become the leading cause of death
nationwide for people under the age of 50” and estimated that opioid overdoses killed
nearly 11,000 Illinois residents between 2008 and 2018.173 At current rates, the Action
Plan predicted “the opioid epidemic will claim the lives of more than 2,700 Illinoisans in
2020.”174 The Action Plan attributed the increase in opioid deaths to “the dramatic rise
in the rate and amount of opioids prescribed for pain over the past decades.”175
The Opioid Act extended the lawful use of medical marijuana to qualifying participants
in an Opioid Alternative Pilot Program who have medical conditions “for which an
opioid has been or could be prescribed by a certifying health care professional based on
generally accepted standards of care.”176 Several studies have found that cancer patients
using marijuana needed fewer opioid painkillers.177 In addition, opioid-related deaths
have declined in states that have legalized medical marijuana.178 But a study published
in the American Journal of Psychiatry found “cannabis use, even among adults with
moderate to severe pain, was associated with a substantially increased risk of
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nonmedical prescription opioid use at 3-year follow-up.”179 The authors of the study
explained that “a strong prospective association between cannabis and opioid use
disorder should nevertheless sound a note of caution in ongoing policy discussions
concerning cannabis and in clinical debate over authorization of medical marijuana to
reduce nonmedical use of prescription opioids and fatal opioid overdoses.”180
Although it is not clear that medical marijuana will reverse any of the alarming trends
associated with the opioids, one thing is clear: there is no known case of human death by
cannabis poisoning.181 Thus, from a public health perspective, marijuana is an
objectively less dangerous option for pain management than opioids. There is, of course,
a certain irony that after a fifty-year war on drugs, a Schedule I narcotic historically
peddled by street-level drug dealers is being promoted by our legislature as an
alternative to physician-prescribed Schedule II opiates. In any event, for individuals
affected by the opiate crisis, any relief is welcome.
Because the provisions of the Opioid Act are integrated into the existing Cannabis Act,
all the employer protections, including the right to administer drug testing and enforce a
zero tolerance policies and/or drug free workplaces182 apply to an individual/employee
who wishes to take advantage of the new law and transition from an opioid to
marijuana. Swapping marijuana for an opioid raises a serious issue for an employee
subject to DOT regulations or a zero-tolerance drug policy. Notwithstanding the welldocumented dangers of opioids, employees are usually able to use physician-prescribed
opioids (when not working) without implicating DOT regulations or even an employer’s
zero-tolerance drug policy. Transitioning from an opioid to medical marijuana may be
prudent from a public or personal health perspective, but for an employee with a CDL or
subject to a zero-tolerance workplace policy, such a transition may result in a positive
drug test and place her job in jeopardy. Whether using marijuana while off duty as a
substitute for an opioid could be considered a “reasonable accommodation” under the
Illinois Human Rights Act is beyond the scope of this paper, but is a plausible argument
that could be asserted on behalf of an employee seeking to transition. For now, the
Opioids Act effectively allows an employer to veto an employee’s decision to transition
from opioids to marijuana, thereby minimizing the possible benefits of the legislation.
VI.

RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA IN ILLINOIS

On July 29, 2016, Illinois became the twenty-first state to decriminalize the possession
of small amounts of marijuana.183 On January 1, 2020, the Illinois Cannabis Regulation
and Tax Act (“Recreational Cannabis Act”) went into effect and Illinois became the
eleventh state to legalize recreational marijuana. 184 The Recreational Cannabis Act
seeks to regulate cannabis “in a manner similar to alcohol…”185 Accordingly, the
legislature eliminated criminal penalties for the possession and personal use of defined
amounts of cannabis flower, cannabis-infused product, and cannabis concentrate for
Illinois residents 21 years of age or older186 and established a plan for the distribution
and taxation of cannabis.187 Despite allowing the personal use of cannabis, the
Recreational Cannabis Act specifically provides that employers are not required to
“allow employees to use or be under the influence of cannabis in the workplace or while
on call”188 and sets forth “specific, articulable symptoms” that evidence impairment.189
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The statute also expressly permits employers to adopt “reasonable” zero-tolerance or
drug-free workplace policies, including drug testing, and allows an employer to
discipline or terminate employees for violating such policies.190 Employers must,
however, afford employees “a reasonable opportunity to contest the determination” of
impairment if it leads to discipline.191
Upon passing the Recreational Cannabis Act, the General Assembly amended the
Illinois Right to Privacy in the Workplace Act (“Privacy Act”) to provide, “[e]xcept as
otherwise specifically provided by law, including Section 10-50 of the Cannabis
Regulation and Tax Act . . . , it shall be unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise disadvantage any individual, with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges or employment because the individual
uses lawful products off the premises of the employer during non-working and non-call
hours.”192 The term “lawful products” is specifically defined as “legal under state law.” 193
The Recreational Cannabis Act also insulates employers from some employee lawsuits.
Specifically, the Act provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to create or imply a cause of action
for any person against an employer … for actions taken pursuant to an
employer’s reasonable drug policy, including but not limited to subjecting
an employee or applicant to reasonable drug and alcohol testing,
reasonable and nondiscriminatory random drug testing, and discipline,
termination of employment, or withdrawal of a job offer due to a failure of
a drug test . . . 194
This language was added to the legislation shortly before the law went into effect at the
urging of the management community.195
A. Consumer Demand for Legal and Illegal Marijuana
In the first month following the enactment of the Recreational Cannabis Act, Illinois
residents spent $30.6 million on recreational marijuana; out-of-state residents spent an
additional $8.6 million—bringing total first month sales to $39.2 million.196 These
strong first month sales generated cannabis tax revenue in the amount of $7.3 million
and sales tax revenue in the amount of $3.1 million.197 The high consumer demand dried
up supply and even forced some dispensaries to close.198 Shortages are expected for
months.199 Annual recreational marijuana sales are expected to generate anywhere from
$500 million200 to $1.6 billion201 in revenue and millions of dollars in annual tax
revenues.202 In fact, the Illinois Department of Revenue forecasts initial tax revenues of
$34 million in 2020, climbing to $375.5 million in 2024.203
B. Marijuana in Illinois
Illinois may have legalized marijuana, but it did not eliminate unlawful marijuana.
Marijuana purchased at legal Illinois dispensaries is subject to state excise taxes ranging
between 10% and 25% (based on THC content), in addition to general state sales tax of
6.25% and local sales taxes as high as 4.75%—resulting in purchase prices twice as much
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as the those paid on the illegal, secondary market.204 Some large Illinois communities,
including Mount Prospect, Arlington Heights, and Naperville, have also exercised their
right to “opt out” and ban recreational sales.205 Illegal drug markets rarely encounter
shortages and drug dealers do not “opt out” of servicing individual communities. The
combination of higher prices, supply problems and out-right bans will allow the black
market to persist in Illinois. Notably, black markets thrived in California and Colorado
even after those states legalized marijuana.206 A recent article in the New York Times
observed that “despite legalization of marijuana in more states—arrests for drugs
increased again last year.”207 Black markets sales will continue, and one would expect
arrests at point of sale and/or for possession of illegally purchased marijuana to
continue, notwithstanding legalization and decriminalization.
C. Marijuana and the Workplace
Even though none of the recent changes in drug laws at the federal and state levels were
intended to reform labor and employment laws, the impact of these legislative changes
will be felt most immediately and acutely in the workplace. As a result of widely
available legal CBD and marijuana, more employees will be coming to work with THC in
their systems. This will present novel issues for employers in safety-sensitive industries
requiring drug-free employees, as well as employers in non-safety sensitive industries
that nevertheless demand workers to remain drug-free.
As explained above, a common drug test often mistakes CBD for THC.208 In addition,
the DEA tells us that “all extracts that contain CBD will also contain at least small
amounts of other cannabinoids.”209 A small amount of the other most common
cannabinoid in hemp (THC) revealed on a drug test is enough to violate a zerotolerance policy. In detecting a small amount of TCH, a drug test cannot determine
whether that small amount of THC is the residual of a larger amount of marijuana
ingested days or weeks earlier or simply the small amount accompanying the larger CBD
product used more recently. The JAMA study cited above found most CBD products are
not labeled properly and detected TCH levels sufficient to product intoxication or
impairment in 20% of the CBD products tested.210 For all these reasons, an employee
who is otherwise respectful of an employer’s zero-tolerance policy has a reasonable
chance of failing a drug test upon taking a lawful CBD product.
The availability of unregulated CBD products that likely contain some amounts of THC
will make zero-tolerance policies difficult to administer. An employer with a zerotolerance policy will find itself on the horns of a dilemma if faced with an employee who
has failed a drug test after taking a falsely-labeled CBD product. Discipline seems
unwarranted, unnecessarily punitive and lacking in just cause. Yet creating an exception
for CBD products will likely undermine an entire policy, as any self-respecting
marijuana user subject to a zero-tolerance policy will likely have ample supplies of CBD
products to present in the event of a failed drug test. Difficult choices like these may
prompt some employers to reconsider the value of maintaining zero-tolerance policies
or the consequences of failing a drug test. As explained, above, even the DOT regulations
do not require discipline upon a failed drug test. Instead, the regulations only require an
employer to remove an employee from a safety-sensitive position until that employee
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passes a return-to-duty test.211 The increasing popularity of unregulated CBD may cause
employers to consider severing discipline from drug testing, or at least
reconceptualizing discipline as it relates to drug testing.
Despite legalization, employees will continue to buy, sell, and use illegally obtained
marijuana, and drug arrests may actually increase.212 In the past, drug arrests and
convictions often spilled over into the workplace, leading to discipline for off-duty
conduct and union grievances in response. These cases will also likely continue,
although the criminal penalties in cases involving possession of small amounts of
marijuana may not be as severe in the wake of decriminalization. Arbitrators reviewing
discipline for off-duty conduct typically require a showing of a “nexus” between the offduty conduct and an employer’s legitimate business interest.213 In drug cases, this is
often established by showing that the off-duty conduct could seriously damage an
employer’s public image or that the conduct makes it impossible for supervisors or coworkers to deal with the employee.214 After the passage of the Recreational Cannabis
Act, an off-duty case involving a marijuana arrest looks more like a tax avoidance case
than a traditional drug crime. Whether an employer will be able to establish the
requisite nexus in such cases will depend on the specific facts of the case, but the
existence of the Recreational Cannabis Act will make it more difficult to establish an
injury to an employer’s reputation or co-worker backlash.
The Recreational Cannabis Act envisions treating marijuana “in a manner similar to
alcohol”215 and does not require employers to tolerate employees who are “under the
influence of cannabis in the workplace or while on call.”216 There is an obvious appeal to
thinking about marijuana in the same way we think about alcohol. The difficulty, of
course, is with the ability to test real-time impairment of individuals suspected of being
under the influence of marijuana. This will prove to be one of the biggest issues for
employers willing to allow off-duty marijuana usage but demanding workplace sobriety.
Currently available drug tests reveal use, not impairment; such tests “cannot ascertain
the quantity of a drug consumed, the time of consumption, or its effect on the user.”217
The best available tests can only establish that a person has used marijuana in the last
few days.218 Until tests for real-time impairment are available, employers will be forced
to rely on subjective factors in evaluating employees for workplace impairment. 219
Discipline based on subjective evaluations will almost certainly be challenged through
union grievance procedures. These cases will ultimately end up in arbitration where the
employers will have the burden under the traditional just cause standard to prove
impairment through testimony from decision-makers about their subjective evaluations
of the grievant. Cases based on subjective evaluations are always difficult, but this new
category of cases will prove even more difficult considering the range of THC content
available today. Malcom Gladwell observed in The New Yorker that “[b]ecause of recent
developments in plant breeding and growing techniques, the typical concentration of
THC … has gone from the low single digits (in the 1980s and 1990s) to more than twenty
percent—from a swig of near-beer to a tequila shot.”220 Writing in the New York Times,
two physicians explained, “[i]n the early 1990s, the average THC content for confiscated
marijuana was roughly 3.7 percent. By contrast, a recent analysis of marijuana for sale
in Colorado’s authorized dispensaries showed an average THC content of 18.7
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percent.”221 High potency strains of marijuana contain THC levels as high as 28
percent.222
An employee using marijuana with low THC content before or during work will likely
exhibit behaviors vastly different from an employee using marijuana with high THC
content. The variability in THC levels will make it difficult for employers to standardize
evaluation criteria. The Supreme Court teaches us that labor arbitrators are usually
chosen because of their “knowledge of the common law of the shop.”223 Arbitrators have
no particular expertise in determining impairment after-the-fact. Arbitrators, as well as
labor and management advocates, will have to learn how to evaluate claims of
impairment in response to a new category of grievances created by the Recreational
Cannabis Act and modern growing techniques.
Congress and the General Assembly legalized CBD and marijuana, respectively, without
giving much thought about how these laws will affect the workplace. Even though CBD
and marijuana will affect the workplace, the precise impact is unknown at this point.
This Article has identified a few areas that may be affected by these new laws, but this
analysis is by no means intended to be exhaustive. In fact, one would expect legal CBD
and marijuana will affect the workplace in ways not contemplated by Congress, the
General Assembly, or this Article. Practitioners now find themselves in uncharted
waters.
D. Pre-Employment Testing
The management bar applauded the General Assembly’s eleventh-hour decision to
strengthen employer protections in the marijuana legislation.224 In explaining the new
law to clients and potential clients, several management firms have taken aggressive
positions on pre-employment, post-offer drug testing. Two management lawyers
believe, for example: “These amendments [to the Recreational Cannabis Act] make clear
that employers may continue pre-employment drug testing and, to the extent
permissible by the employer’s policy, withdraw offers of employment to employees who
tested positive for cannabis use . . . ”225 There are at least two problems with this
assertion.
First, no Illinois court has considered the issue of pre-employment, post-offer drug
testing since the recent passage of the statute. Expressing certitude about an eventual
interpretation of a new statute is dangerous.226 Second, on the merits, the law does not
seem that clear to warrant such certainty. As explained above, the Privacy Act provides,
in relevant part, “except as provided in Section 10-50 of the Cannabis Regulation and
Tax Act it shall be unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire… any individual… because
the individual uses lawful products . . . ”
Sections 10-50 (a) through (c) provide that nothing in the Act: (a) prohibits an employer
from adopting reasonable policies concerning the use of cannabis in the workplace; (b)
requires an employer to permit an employee to be under the influence in the workplace;
or (c) limits or prevents an employer from disciplining or terminating an employee for
violating an employer’s workplace drug policy.227 Absent from this section of the statute
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is any language suggesting that an employer may withdraw a job offer based on a
positive drug test. Given the structure of the statute, if the legislature intended to permit
the withdrawal of post-testing job offers, one would have expected language to the effect
of “nothing in the Act limits or prevents and employer from withdrawing a job offer if an
employee tests positive for marijuana on pre-employment drug test.” The statute does
not say this.
Section 10-50(e)(1) of the Recreational Cannabis Act does, however, provide, “[n]othing
in this Act shall be construed to create or imply a cause of action for any person against
an employer for: . . . withdrawal of a job offer . . . due to a failure of a drug test.”228
Importantly, a cause of action in response to a withdrawal of job offering following a
positive drug would likely be brought under the Privacy Act, not the Recreational
Cannabis Act. For its part, Section 15(c) of the Privacy Act provides, “If an employer or
prospective employer violates this Act, an employee or applicant for employment may
commence an action in the circuit court to enforce the provisions of this Act . . . ” 229 And,
Section 10-50(f) of the Recreational Cannabis Act provides, “[n]othing in this Act shall
be construed to enhance or diminish protections afforded by any other law . . . ”230
The question for Illinois courts will be whether the language in Section 10-50(e)(1) of
the Recreational Cannabis Act (i.e., “nothing in this Act shall be construed to create or
imply a cause of action for any person against an employer for: . . . withdrawal of a job
offer due to a failure of a drug test) trumps Section 15 of the Privacy Act which creates a
private right of action against a prospective employer that refuses to hire an employee
because she used a lawful product. To defeat a claim brought under the Privacy Act, a
prospective employer will have to persuade a court that the cause of action was, in fact,
“created” by the Recreational Cannabis Act, not the Privacy Act. The answer to this
question is not as clear as some management firms have suggested. In harmonizing the
two statutes, a court could reasonably find that an employer violates the Privacy Act if it
withdraws a job offer because a prospective employee fails a pre-employment drug test.
Particularly since an employer may, under the Recreational Cannabis Act, clearly
enforce a zero-tolerance policy, the better approach in such a case may be for the
employer to follow through on the offer of employment, but advise the employee of the
employer’s policies and counsel the employee that future marijuana use will not be
tolerated.
By taking an aggressive approach to pre-employment drug tests, employers will find that
they are excluding otherwise qualified candidates from the hiring process. Objective
evidence reveals that Americans have a growing appetite for marijuana. The 2013 ACLU
report discussed above found over 7 million people were arrested for marijuana
possession between 2001 and 2010.231 These were only the people who were caught. The
study from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration discussed
above estimated that 43.5 million Americans (15.9% of the population) used marijuana
in 2018.232 Although estimated use rates were highest among people aged 18 to 25
(34.8%), 28.5 million (13.3%) adults aged 26 or older used marijuana in 2018. 233 This
represented an increase from 2002–2017.234 Eight million people reportedly use
marijuana every day.235 These numbers on usage help explain the nearly $40 million in
first month marijuana sales in Illinois. Many people use this drug and usage rates in

SPRING 2020

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

21

Illinois will likely continue to increase with the passage of the Recreational Cannabis
Act. Putting aside the question of whether it is lawful to withdraw a job offer following a
positive drug test, it seems irrational for an employer to exclude so many people from
the hiring process simply because they may have used or are using marijuana. Indeed, it
is hard to imagine an employer implementing any policy that would systematically
exclude 13% to 35% of working-age adults from the hiring process, yet this would be the
effect of a rigid drug policy that relies on pre-employment drug screening.
Employers are always on much firmer ground regulating on-duty employee conduct, as
opposed to off-duty conduct. As explained above, to sustain the discipline for off-duty
conduct, arbitrators typically require employers to establish a nexus between the alleged
conduct and an employer’s legitimate interest. The idea that an employer could regulate
pre-employment, lawful conduct by rescinding a job offer following a pre-employment
drug test seems to stretch existing doctrine too far. Using existing doctrine as a guide, it
is difficult to imagine what interest an employer could articulate that could justify the
rescission of an offer of employment upon learning than an employee used lawful
marijuana while unemployed, for example. From a policy perspective, even someone
opposed to employees using marijuana while off-duty might concede that a period of
unemployment is an appropriate time for a person to use lawful marijuana. A person
whose job offer has just been rescinded may not have recourse to a collectively
bargained grievance procedure and arbitration, but that same person would present as a
sympathetic plaintiff in a suit brought under the Privacy Act in a case of first impression
to test the limits of the new legislation.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Marijuana was never as dangerous as Congress declared in passing the CSA and it is
likely not the risk-free wonder drug that some advocates of medical marijuana have
posited. Legalization efforts at the state level may eventually pressure Congress to
reclassify marijuana on the CSA schedule. Until that happens people will continue to use
marijuana for medicinal purposes under the cover of state law. People will also continue
to use CBD products, often purchased online, to address a host of ailments. As people
learn more about the dangers associated with opioids, patients may also turn to medical
marijuana for post-surgery relief instead of filling initial prescriptions for opioids.
Patients already taking an opioid may attempt to wean themselves by transitioning to
medical marijuana. And with the recent passage of the Recreational Cannabis Act, many
people (both veteran and new users) will use marijuana without fear of arrest or
prosecution. All of this is to say that because of the passage of the 2018 Farm Bill at the
federal level, and the Medical Marijuana Act and the Recreational Cannabis Act in
Illinois, THC is now a lawful part of the lives of many Illinois residents—many of whom
also happen to be employees.
Despite legalizing medical and recreational marijuana in the main, the General
Assembly preserved the right of employers to enforce their own drug policies. Under
this framework, non-employees (students, retirees, etc.) may use marijuana for medical
or recreational purposes without incident or repercussion. Employees, on the other
hand, may only use marijuana without consequence if their employer does not maintain
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and enforce a drug policy. At least with respect to working adults, the legislature has
essentially outsourced state drug policy to management in the non-union setting and to
labor and management in the unionized setting.236 In the past labor and management
could avoid the issue of marijuana in the workplace by hiding behind state and federal
laws that criminalized the drug—workplace prohibitions on marijuana usage were
justified because marijuana was illegal. That cover is now gone. Labor and management
must now wrestle with the issue and find solutions that match the realities of the
workplace. It will now be up to employers and unions to decide the permissible limits of
marijuana usage for employees. One would expect a public works contract to deal with
marijuana differently than a contract covering custodians, for example.
There will be little debate that workplace impairment (from drugs or alcohol) is
unacceptable. Policing workplace marijuana impairment will be difficult, however, until
affordable, reliable, real-time testing becomes available. Off-duty employee marijuana
usage presents an even more difficult issue for employers. The General Assembly
preserved employers’ right to maintain zero-tolerance policies but created conditions
that will make it impossible for employers to maintain the status quo. Legalization
created a new consumer market and consumer demand for marijuana is high.
Furthermore, the legalization of CBD at the federal level means that non-marijuana
using employees will have THC in their systems, which will be detectable on drug tests.
Positive test results for non-marijuana using employees will undermine the legitimacy of
drug testing or result in unwarranted discipline—both of which are bad outcomes.
Macroeconomic conditions will ultimately pressure Illinois employers to liberalize or
eliminate existing drug policies. Illinois legalized marijuana at a time of historically low
unemployment rates; in January 2020 the unemployment rate in Illinois was 3.5%. 237
Prior to the economic collapse caused by COVID-19, many employers reported
shortages of skilled workers in the labor market.238 In 2018 the Bureau of Labor
Statistics estimated there were only 6.4 million workers available to fill 6.7 million open
positions.239 Labor shortages were particularly acute in the public sector.240 On March
21, 2020, Illinois shut down non-essential portions of its economy in response to
COVID-19, 241 causing an immediate spike in unemployment rates. As of April 2020, the
unemployment rate in Illinois was 16.4%.242 At the time of this writing, many states,
including Illinois, have instituted plans to reopen their economies.243 It is doubtful
Illinois will return to historically low unemployment rates any time soon and it is
unclear how Illinois’s economy will ultimately respond to this health crisis. It is clear,
however, that certain industries will fare better than others. Many employees in
industries deemed “essential”—including construction, health care, food production,
distribution, utilities, critical trades, public safety, transportation, etc.244-- remained
working through the early days of the crisis and will continue to do so. Illinois’s
unemployment rate will likely remain high in the short run, but tight labor market
conditions will continue in essential industries.
In early 2020, before the first reported U.S. death caused by COVID-19, the General
Assembly’s decision to legalize marijuana was the topic de jure for practitioners. On
May 27, 2020, the U.S. reached the grim milestone of 100,000 reported deaths caused
by COVID-19.245 That number will continue to increase. This health crisis highlights the
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insignificance of most of the issues (including legalized marijuana) that advocates for
labor and management debate so vigorously in this publication, at conferences and
across the bargaining table. The crisis will hopefully end soon with as little more human
and economic damage as possible. And one day we will return to debating the more
mundane issues of labor and employment law, including the General Assembly’s
decision to legalize marijuana.
When that day comes, we will see that employers in safety-sensitive industries will have
little choice but to maintain restrictions on marijuana usage. Outside of safety-sensitive
industries, however, employers will find that rigid drug policies will be difficult to
administer and will diminish the pool of qualified candidates in the hiring process
and/or threaten existing relationships with skilled employees. In contrast, employers
that do not restrict off-duty marijuana usage may find that the absence of restrictions
will be viewed by some applicants and employees as a benefit which can be exploited for
purposes of recruitment and retention. In the long run, the labor market will be the final
arbiter of whether employers in non-safety sensitive industries will be able to maintain
rigid workplace drug policies.
The legislature allowed employers to maintain the status quo, but the costs of
maintaining rigid drug policies will likely be too high for Illinois employers. Employers
in non-safety sensitive industries opposed to off-duty marijuana use may not fully
appreciate it as yet, but in due time their employees will join the ranks of millions of
other employees across the state who use medical and recreational marijuana without
consequence in the workplace. Marijuana’s “long, strange trip”246 may be coming to an
end in Illinois, but the journey for labor and employment lawyers has just begun as we
all struggle to understand employment in a state where marijuana is no longer verboten
and where employees begin or continue using marijuana and CBD products for
medicinal and recreational purposes. Marijuana is legal in Illinois. Rigid employer drug
policies will now go up in smoke.
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Twenty-First Amendment. That Congress would have restricted or prohibited access to a popular
1

SPRING 2020

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

24

intoxicant four years after Prohibition ended bolsters the argument that early drug laws were driven by
racism and xenophobia, as opposed to any other rational public policy objective.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By Student Editorial Board:
Patrick J. Foote, Mayra Gomez, Michael P. Halpin, and Matt Soaper
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations Report. It
highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public employee relations community.

I.

IELRA Developments

A. Arbitration
In Western Illinois University v. IELRB, 2020 IL App (4th) 190143(4th Dist. Apr. 10,
2020), the Fourth District Appellate Court held that an arbitrator lacks jurisdiction to
determine whether an employer complied with the arbitrator’s award, even though the
arbitrator had retained jurisdiction in the award to resolve disputes with respect to
implementation of the remedy. The court reversed an IELRB determination that the
University had violated section 14(a)(8) of the IELRA when it failed to comply with the
arbitrator’s supplemental award.
Due to declining enrollment, Western Illinois University (WIU) laid off several faculty.
The Union grieved the layoffs and the arbitrator sustained the grievance with respect to
two faculty members, finding that WIU violated the contractual requirement that it
make reasonable efforts to locate other equivalent employment within the university for
them. The arbitrator awarded that WIU make such efforts and retained jurisdiction to
resolve disputes over implementation of the award. Subsequently, WIU notified the two
faculty members that it was unable to find equivalent employment for them. The Union
then moved to invoke the arbitrator’s retained jurisdiction. Over WIU’s objection, the
arbitrator convened a second hearing and found that WIU failed to comply with the first
award and awarded additional remedies. WIU refused to comply with the second award.
The IELRB held that the second award was binding and ordered WIU to comply.
The court held that the question of whether a party has complied with an arbitration
award falls within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the IELRB. Consequently, the
court opined, the arbitrator lacked authority to determine whether WIU complied with
the first award. The court distinguished arbitrator retention of jurisdiction to correct
errors and clarify ambiguities in an award from jurisdiction to determine compliance.
The court further held that the arbitrator lacked contractual authority to decide whether
WIU had complied with the first award. The court observed that the collective
bargaining agreement provided “that ‘[a]rbitration shall be confined solely to the
application and/or interpretation of [the CBA] and the precise issues submitted for
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arbitration” and that the arbitrator “shall have no authority to determine any other
issue(s).’” (Emphasis provided by the court.) The court continued:
[The contract] could have simply stated that “arbitration shall be confined to the
application and/or interpretation of [the CBA] and the issue submitted to
arbitration,” but the actual sentence says much more. By including the modifiers
“solely” and “precise” in that sentence, the CBA makes clear that the scope of the
arbitrator's powers must be construed narrowly, not broadly. To conclude
otherwise would render the addition of those modifiers meaningless. And if the
presence of those modifiers were somehow not adequate to get this message
across, the very next sentence of article 6.12(b) of the CBA makes the meaning of
that article clear by stating the following: “The arbitrator shall have no authority
to determine any other issue(s).” (Emphasis in original.)
The court viewed the precise issue submitted to the arbitrator as whether WIU complied
with the contractual layoff procedures. According to the court, the arbitrator’s first
award finding that WIU had not complied with those procedures was within the
arbitrator’s authority but the second award, finding that WIU had not complied with the
first award, was outside the scope of that authority. The court remanded the case to the
IELRB, instructing the IELRB to determine whether WIU complied with the first award.
B. Exclusive Representation and Union Membership
In Bennett v. AFSCME Council 31, 2020 WL 1549603 (C.D. Ill. March 31, 2020), the
U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois upheld the constitutionality of the
IELRA’s provision that a union selected by the majority of employees in a bargaining
unit is the exclusive representative of all unit employees. The court also held
constitutional the collection of union dues from a bargaining unit member despite her
claim that she would not have joined the union had she known that she could not
constitutionally be required to pay a fair share fee.
Susan Bennett was a custodian for the Moline-Coal Valley School District No. 40 and
was represented by AFSCME Local 672. Bennett joined Local 672 in 2017 and
authorized the deduction of union dues from her pay. She resigned her membership in
2019 during a window for such resignations established in the dues deduction
authorization card. She sued, contending that she had had a constitutional right to
resign at any time and that her membership in the union was coerced and involuntary
because she had joined believing that her only alternative was to pay a fair share fee
even though such fees were declared unconstitutional in Janus v. AFSCME Council 31,
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). She further alleged that the IELRA’s provision making AFSCME
her exclusive representative violated her right to be free from compelled association
with the union.
The court held that Bennett’s decision to join the union was not obtained under physical
or economic compulsion. The court opined that merely because Bennett would have
made a different decision in 2017 had she realized that the Supreme Court would
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invalidate fair share fees a year later did not render her uncoerced decision void. The
court reasoned that intervening changes in the law do not invalidate an otherwise lawful
agreement. The court observed that criminal defendants are not allowed to withdraw
plea agreements that waive their rights to appeal or collaterally attack their convictions
merely because the Supreme Court subsequently modifies constitutional law or criminal
procedure in their favor.
Turning to Bennett’s constitutional challenge to AFSCME’s status as exclusive
representative, the court observed that the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have
upheld exclusive representation against constitutional attack, citing Minnesota State
Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1985); Hill v. SEIU, 850 F.3d
861 (7th Cir. 2017). The court concluded that Janus did not disturb the holdings of these
cases.
C. Preliminary Injunctive Relief
In Board of Trustees of Triton Community College District No. 504 and Cook County
College Teachers’ Union, Local 1600, IFT-AF, 36 PERI ¶ 96 (IELRB 2019), the IELRB
denied the college district employer’s request for injunctive relief relating to two unfair
practice charges in which the employer alleged the union engaged in bad faith
bargaining and that the union engaged in an unlawful strike.
In deciding whether injunctive relief was appropriate in each charge, the IELRB relied
on Section 16(d) of the IELRA, which provides that the IELRB may petition the circuit
court for appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order once an unfair labor
practice complaint has been issued. The Board also relied on University of Illinois
Hospital, 2 PERI 1138 (IELRB 1986), in which the Board held preliminary injunctive
relief is appropriate where there is reasonable cause to believe that the Act may have
been violated and where injunctive relief is just and proper.
On November 4, 2019, Triton Community College District No. 504 filed two charges
with the IELRB against Cook County College Teachers’ Union, Local 1600, IFT-AFT. In
the first charge, the College alleged the Union violated sections 14 (b)(3) and (1) of the
IELRA when it withdrew from, proposed changes to and tried to renegotiate the parties’
tentative agreement for a successor collective bargaining agreement. The College also
alleged that the Union engaged in regressive and bad faith bargaining, failed to
designate agents with sufficient bargaining authority to engage in meaningful
negotiations, failed to support the parties’ tentative agreement, and unlawfully failed
and refused to bargain in good faith.
On October 24, the parties reached and signed a tentative agreement. The agreement
contained the following language: “By signing below, the parties agree that this is the
settlement agreed to between them and shall be presented to their respective bodies for
ratification and shall be recommended for approval.” The Union’s bargaining team
presented the agreement to its membership as the College’s last, best, and final offer
rather than as a tentative agreement. When the Union’s members sought answers to
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specific questions, the Union’s negotiators refused to reach out to the College and seek
answers. On October 30, the bargaining unit rejected the agreement presented for
ratification. The College argued that the Union, by distributing the tentative agreement
to its membership with no explanation, presenting it as a last, best, and final offer, and
subsequently withdrawing from that agreement on key terms and introducing new items
at the very last minute of negotiations, breached its duty to support the tentative
agreement.
The IELRB found the facts as presented by the College sufficiently established
reasonable cause to believe the Union had violated the IELRA but did not find the
allegations serious and extraordinary enough to grant preliminary injunctive relief. The
IELRB noted that while it was unusual that the misconduct was alleged by an
educational employer against a labor organization the remedy would nonetheless be the
same: the respondent could cease and desist from refusing to bargain as opposed to
being subject to an injunction.
In the second charge, the College alleged the Union violated Sections 14(b)(3) and (1)
and Section 13(b) of the IELRA when it announced its intent to engage in a strike before
completing all the requirements of Section 13(b) of the Act and when it engaged in a
one-day strike on November 6.
The College alleged the Union did not comply with the Section 13(b)(3) requirements:
“that at least 10 days have elapsed after a notice of intent to strike has been given by the
exclusive bargaining representative to the educational employer, the regional
superintendent and the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board” because the Union
did not serve its notice of intent to strike on the superintendent.
The IELRB held the College did not have a significant likelihood of prevailing on the
merits of the case because it was unclear whether there was a regional superintendent
with jurisdiction over the College, requiring the issue to be determined by an
Administrative Law Judge. Furthermore, if no regional superintendent with jurisdiction
over the College was found, the strike would have met the requirements in 13(b).
While the IELRB, in Joliet Junior College, 8 PERI 1011 (IELRB 1991), granted a
community college employer’s request to seek injunctive relief where the union engaged
in a strike without serving the regional superintendent, the case could not be relied on in
this case. Joliet Junior College had been granted relief because Section 13 had “no
special rules dispensing with service of the Notice of Intent to Strike on the Regional
Superintendent when the educational employer is a community college” at the time.
However, the Section was amended in 2014 and now requires a notice of intent to strike
to be served on a superintendent “if one exists with jurisdiction over the educational
employer.” See 80 Ill. Adm. Code 1130.40(a). If there is no regional superintendent for
community colleges, the union is excused from serving a notice of intent to strike on the
regional superintendent.
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The Board also held preliminary injunctive relief was not just and proper, reasoning that
there was nothing left for an injunction to restore. The strike at issue lasted one day,
November 6, and the bargaining units had returned to work. Furthermore, there was no
evidence of any threat of another strike. In fact, there was a letter from the Union
President that clearly stated “there would not be another strike without fulfilling the
statutory requirements in the IELRA.
Accordingly, even if there was reasonable cause to believe that the Act may have been
violated by the strike, preliminary injunctive relief was not just and proper in this
second charge as well.
II.

IPLRA Developments

A. Discrimination Based on Protected Activity
In AFSCME Council 31 and County of DuPage (DuPage Care Center), 36 PERI ¶ 114
(ILRB State Panel 2020), the State Panel reversed the Executive Director’s dismissal of
an unfair practice charge that alleged that the DuPage Care Center (“DCC”) discharged a
union steward because of his protected concerted activity. The ILRB found the Union
submitted sufficient evidence to warrant issuance of a complaint. The case presented
legal and factual disputes on whether the discharged employee engaged in protected
activity and whether the employer was aware of the activity.
During the initial investigation, the Executive Director found the following. On April 21,
2019, Abderrahim Bezzaz, a certified nursing assistant (CNA) and member of the
union’s collecting bargaining committee, arrived for an overtime shift at DCC. One
nursing supervisor instructed him to report to a particular unit. A second nursing
supervisor, Maria Bamberger, instructed him to go to a different unit. When Bezzaz
questioned Bamberger’s instruction, she gave Bezzaz an ultimatum: report to 2-East
unit or leave the facility. Bezzaz decided to leave.
On April 23, 2019, Bezzaz attended an investigatory meeting regarding the events of
April 21, 2019. During the meeting, DCC accused Bezzaz of “insubordination, using
profanity, and abandoning his shift[,]” and using profanity and threatening language
against Bamberger. On April 25, 2019, DCC sent Bezzaz a letter terminating his
employment.
The Charging Party argued that Bezzaz was terminated because he served as a union
steward. Further, the Charging Party argued Bezzaz’s use of threatening language
encompassed his threat to report Bamberger’s actions to the Union. The Charging Party
argued this constituted “protected activity to seek union assistance.” The Executive
Director found that the Charging Party failed to show a causal nexus between Bezzaz’s
engagement in protected activity and his discharge.
To establish a charge of discrimination for engaging in protected activity, a charging
party must demonstrate that “(1) the employee at issue was engaged in union or
protected concerted activity; (2) the employer knew of his conduct, and (3) the employer
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took the adverse action against him in whole or in part because of his protected
conduct.”
In this case, the State Panel found, Bezzaz was a union steward and involved in the
negotiation of a first contract between the Union and DCC. DCC was aware of Bezzaz’s
activities. Further, the ILRB concluded Bezzaz’s threat was protected because he
“intended to seek assistance or mutual aid and protection from the Union” arising out of
his dispute with Bamberger regarding his overtime shift. The Union also presented
evidence that DCC initially responded to Bezzaz’s “threat” as an indication he was
reporting Bamberger to the Union.
The State Panel found the third prong sufficiently satisfied to warrant issuance of a
complaint. Bezzaz was terminated only five months after AFSCME Council 31 was
certified as the bargaining representative and while he was serving on the team
negotiating the first contract. Further, Bezzaz’s threat to report Bamberger to the Union
occurred only several days before he was terminated The ILRB found that these
circumstances raised issues of fact concerning the causal connection between Bezzaz’s
protected activity and his discharge, as well as whether DCC acted with intent to
discourage membership in the union. The State Panel concluded that a complaint
should issue.

